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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

9 March 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Laurin B. Askew
Director, Vietnam Working Group
Department of State

SUBJECT : Suggested Changes in 3/8/73 Draft
Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger

1. Appended as an annex is a substitute for your draft's first two pages -- a substitute offered for your consideration.

2. On your Option 1, I would add the following as a final sentence to the "TIMING" paragraph:

In fact, we recommend that such a step
be initiated immediately by whatever private
channels are deemed most appropriate.

3. On Option 3, I would suggest inserting the parenthetical phrase "(separate ones)" after the first word ("Representations").

4. On Option 5, add one more "con":

-- The signal to Hanoi that we were
serious would probably be considerably
clearer if we confined ourselves to strong,
private approaches to Hanoi, Moscow and
Peking.

5. On Option 6, again add one more "con":

-- Our taking this tack would probably
be read in Hanoi as a sign that we were
blustering and did not contemplate
serious, drastic action.

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6. Same on Option 7:

-- Again, Hanoi would see us as being more interested in complaining than in acting.

7. On Option 8:

a. State Option as follows:

Reveal in detail for public knowledge the record of North Vietnamese infiltration of men and supplies, and use of Laos, in violation of the Agreement. This could be done by issuing a carefully prepared "White Paper," a formal State Department, Defense Department or White House briefing, or some combination of these and/or other means.

b. Add one more "pro":

-- Our "going public" would lay the groundwork and rationale for any subsequent military action we might decide to take. Also, Hanoi would probably read this move as being designed to prepare public opinion for a resumption of military action.

c. I have troubles with the stated judgment on timing and would prefer language along the following lines:

Though there is some risk that our making such a public charge might complicate the release of U.S. prisoners, Hanoi would be hard put to justify holding back on prisoner releases simply because we were complaining about alleged North

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Vietnamese violations. We would recommend that at least some overt manifestation of U.S. Government concern -- which, in the process, would start getting the situation before the public -- be initiated immediately. Our public statements here can then be orchestrated with our private approaches to Hanoi, Moscow and Peking.


8. Option 10:

- a. First "pro," I suggest you substitute "harassing" for "threatening" (before "tone").
- b. Third "pro," after "actions," suggest you substitute: "or perhaps modify them (though it is unlikely that psyops alone could produce this result)."

9. Military Option 8, in first "pro" for "infiltration" substitute:

"the movement of Communist supplies and forces within South Vietnam."

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Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

25X1A9a O/DCI/SAVA: [redacted] /mee
Orig - Addressee

25X1A9a1 - [redacted] (Options paper) ✓
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